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Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of
constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth,
its ‘general politics’ of truth; the true mechanisms and instances which enable one to
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those
who are charged with saying what counts as true.
- Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 1980
Thesis Statement and Questions
The goal of this thesis is to determine the assumptions, limits and implications of German
refugee discourse. Thus, the central question herein must be, What is the overriding
representation of Syrian refugees in German media and political discourse and what are the
implications of such discourse, both within and outside Europe? More specifically, I will attempt
to locate the implications of refugee-rhetoric with regards to both the internal treatment of
Syrians in Germany and the external policy of the EU in Syria. To accomplish this, I will first
investigate media representations of the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis within the mainstream
German press. This will show the overarching themes in representation within Germany and,
further, will reflect how the mainstream political centre frames the issue. In turn, such a media
critique must be followed by a critical reading of the dominant German political approaches and
rhetoric with regards to Syrian refugees. In terms of relevance and influence, the two approaches
within Germany are a neutral-humanitarian centrist discourse, advocated by the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and an intolerant right wing
discourse, advocated on the official level by the Alternative for Germany Party (AfD) and the
grassroots PEGIDA movement. When relevant, I will also examine the historical politicaleconomic relationship between the European Union and Syria, highlighting the material motives
which underlie their present political approach.
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What I hope to reveal from such an inquiry is the degree to which the representation of
Syrian refugees is rooted in both concrete geopolitical realities and cultural politics which have
little to do with humanitarianism or the refugees themselves. Such representation, rooted in
European interests in the Middle East and a historically constructed perception of cultural
difference, has serious effects on the way in which Syrians are treated in Germany. Furthermore,
the implications of such discourse cannot be located solely within Europe. These implications
transcend geography, and thus have negative implications on the lived experience of Syrians in
their own nation by virtue of extending the conflict which drives displacement. I will argue, after
this thorough investigation into German refugee discourse, that the suffering of Syrians, when
pulled from its political context, can be exploited as a means of obscuring more dubious cultural
and material interests. Thus the two competing variables affecting refugees and Syrians more
generally are cultural-political representation and the material exercise of European power in the
Middle East. Hopefully, this paper will arrive at an understanding of the ways in which these two
elements reinforce each other and influence the treatment of Syrians in Germany and, more
generally, Muslims in the West during the ongoing and increasingly expansive ‘War on Terror’.
Refugees- A Great Challenge [for Germany and Europe]
Last spring, I had the chance to spend a semester in Berlin, Germany to study History.
One day, my German class went on a field trip to the German Foreign Office, to see a photo
exhibition on display in the main lobby of the building. The exhibition, by German artist
Herlinde Koelbl, titled Refugees- A Great Challenge, attempted to show what happened to
refugees once they arrived in Europe. In addition, the installation featured exhibits describing the
various humanitarian efforts Germany was undertaking with its refugee policy and policy on

Zarif !4

Syria more generally. These aspects of the exhibition were elaborated in a pamphlet describing
the art project. The pamphlet opens with a statement from German Federal Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who writes that,
In a world that has come out of joint with a great number of crises and conflicts, millions
of people leave everything behind them and seek, often literally with their last ounce of
strength, protection and security far from their homes . Helping people who have fled
political persecution, war and violence, is and remains a humanitarian imperative.1
His statement goes on to describe the various external humanitarian efforts which the German
government has undertaken in conflict areas like Syria, including education programs for Syrian
students and medical aid to the White Helmets.2 In turn, he describes the photo project as “an
impressive visual appeal to us all to keep up our efforts to help those seeking protection”.3
The pamphlet and photography project are interesting for several reasons. Most
importantly, both Steinmeier’s statement and Koelbl’s art reinforce the dominant rhetorical
approach which Germany has taken with regards to Syria and refugees. Namely, it is that of pure
humanitarianism. In this discourse, the decision to admit Syrian refugees, fund democratizing
institutions in Syria, and provide educational outreach to Syrians, are done not out of any
particular interest, but out of a recognition of a common humanity. In turn, the actual images of
the project de-contextualize and homogenize the refugees entering Europe, engaging them purely
on the basis of human suffering and a desire for protection. In this discourse, Germany is
1

Federal Foreign Office, Refugees- A Great Challenge: Exposition with Photographies by
Herlinde Koelbl and ‘The Engagement of the Federal Foreign Office’ ed. Auswärtiges Amt., 5.
2

Ibid., 5.

3

Ibid., 5.
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positioned as impartial and necessarily good. “Crises and conflicts” driving migration are
stripped of their geopolitical contexts and presented as inevitable and distant. There is little
connection between these events and the humanitarianism of nations like Germany. Attempting
to explore the German or European interests which exist in these individual conflicts and crises
is thereby impossible within such a framework.
The EU and Syria: Framing the German Approach to Refugees
The German approach to Syrian refugees, while shifting over time, has been linguistically
premised on humanitarianism and reinforced by a similar pretension to neutrality in the EU
policy on Syria. However, this disinterested approach should be called into question when
considering the material interests of the EU in Syria. Before the 2011 Revolution, 95% of all
Syrian oil exports went to the European Union, with the largest share (32%) going to Germany.4
Syria made up roughly 1% of total EU oil imports, with 40% of its total oil from other OPEC
nations.5 Saudi Arabia provides 8% of total EU oil imports.6 However, beginning in 2007, the
highly uneven trade relationship between the European Union and Syria began to shift, as Syria
strengthened its trade with more traditional allies including Iran.7 In turn, this economic shift
towards Iran, put Syria in direct conflict with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a large
recipient of European weapons exports whose governments have contributed significantly to the
financial development of Syria’s private Sunni religious institutions.
4

Almohamad, Hussein and Andrea Dittman, “Oil in Syria Between Terrorism and Dictatorship”, 2.

5

European Commission. Supplier Countries published by the European Commission under
Energy section on ec.europa.eu. 2017.
6

Ibid.

7

Rafizadeh, Majid, “Iran’s Economic Stake in Syria” in Foreign Policy.
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Further, Syria’s partial embrace of neoliberalism in the early 2000’s followed by a
renewed secularist authoritarian crackdown on Sunni Islamic authorities made it a complicated
partner for the European Union. This can be demonstrated in the EU’s failed attempt at an
economic treaty with the Syrian government, which would have forced the privatization of large
sectors of Syria’s large public economy.8 The deal would have also cemented the unbalanced
trade relationship between the EU and Syria. Due to political pressure from the U.S., the deal
was eventually abandoned by the EU in 2004.9 At the same time as this breakdown in the
historically strong Syrian-EU relations, Russia began to emerge as a political and financial
supporter of the Assad regime, with Syria hosting Russia’s sole military base in the Middle
East.10 The historical relationship between Syria and the USSR/Russian Federation had also been
strongly established, but this political-economic pivot away from Europe provided the impetus
for a further deepening of ties between Assad and Putin. While political relations began to turn
after the breakdown of the EU-Syria trade agreement, the beneficial import of oil to the
European Union continued however, showing a willingness in Europe to work with a
government which, by then, had committed well-documented violations of human rights.
The Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad had shown an ideological flexibility
which made stable economic and political relations difficult for the European Union. In response
to these unstable relations and wider insecurity in the Middle East, the EU strengthened its
economic and security ties to Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and Qatar during the same time Syria
8

Dostal, Jörg and Anja Zorob, Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship, 4.

9

Ibid., 4.

10Sweijs, Tim

et al. “Why are Pivot States so Pivotal?: The Role of Pivot States in Regional and Global Security” in
HCSS Strategic Monitor 2014, published by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2014, 34.
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drifted politically towards Russia and Iran.11 At the same time, the Syrian Sunni ummah and
private Islamic charities in the Gulf also strengthened ties, as attempts by the Syrian government
at the public institutionalization of religion failed amid ideological and sectarian differences and
resulted in an increase in foreign funding of Sunni mosques, mostly from GCC nations.12 These
developments further complicated the relations between Syria and the EU. What resulted from
this was a situation in 2011 in which the European Union was forced by pragmatic concerns to
support a mostly religious uprising against a secular government.13 Almost immediately after the
conflict became militarized and escalated into full scale civil war, European leaders, including
Angela Merkel, immediately called for Assad’s ouster. Their interests in making and, to this day,
maintaining such a strong position are clear, yet hidden within a general discourse of
humanitarian concern for the Syrian people. The imposition of a Gulf-aligned regime in Syria
would sharply increase the influence of conservative Saudi Arabia in the region, relative to the
radical Iranian government. As Gulf interests in the region mostly align with European ones, this
would also increase the power of the EU, already a large presence in terms of economic and
political influence.14 Syria’s possible alignment with Gulf nations could also represent, in the
eyes of EU policy makers, an easier partner for the imposition of the neoliberal economic
reforms which Assad had partially rejected over a decade earlier. Embracing humanitarianism on

11

Kostadinova, Valentina, “What is the status of the EU-GCC Relationship?” in GRC Gulf Papers published by the
Gulf Research Center. 2013.
12

Pierret, Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution 161.

13

Kostadinova, “What is the status of the EU-GCC Relationship?”.

14

Ibid.
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an external paradigm reinforces this status quo while reducing the Syrian war to a simple
narrative of dictatorship vs. democracy.
In turn, the degree to which European states are fueling the war in Syria is a subject of
significant debate. Globally, they are perceived as a marginal diplomatic player in Syria with
little leverage due to their early imposition of sanctions on the Assad regime. However, the EU’s
policy on Syria positions itself as impartial while obscuring some very real interests which are
aided by European material support. When I limit this analysis to interests specific to Germany,
the same basic logic is still applicable. Germany’s arms industry is the third largest in the world
and its largest arms importers includes Qatar, whose government purchased 790.5 million Euros
worth of arms from Germany in 2016.15 Turkey is another large importer of German arms,
purchasing nearly 100 million Euros worth from 2016-2017, though the number has decreased
with tense diplomatic relations between Ankara and Berlin.16 These relationships are significant,
due to the well documented financial and weapons support both Qatar and Turkey have offered
to Islamic opposition groups in Syria, including Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate.17 In turn,
the conflict in Syria has driven down oil prices globally, due to overproduction in the GCC
aimed at limiting Iranian and Russian economic power, as both economies are dependent on oil
exports.18 Such a dip in oil prices, fueled by the continuation of the conflict, is clearly
advantageous for the European Union and other large consumers of fossil fuels.

15

Knight, Ben, “German arms exports dip, but still near record highs”, Deutsche Welle.

16

Chase, Jefferson,“German arms exports - what you need to know”, Deutsche Welle.

17

Byman, Daniel “Outside Support for Insurgent Movements” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 981.

18

Elass, Jareer and Amy Myers Jaffe, “War and the Oil Price Cycle” in Journal of International Affairs , 130.
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Cultural Politics and the Stigmatization of European Muslims
Aside from the connection between refugee policy and foreign policy, German
approaches to Syrian refugees fit into its wider relationship with Islam and its place within
society. The report published by the German Islam Conference (Deutsches Islam Konferenz or
DIK) in 2009 found that employment rates for Muslims in Germany were consistently lower than
those of non-Muslim Germans and that Muslims were much more likely to work in blue-collar
fields.19 Tellingly, DIK was conducted through the Office of Migration and Refugees, showing
that, even after gaining citizenship, German Muslims are permanently considered outsiders.20
More reflective of this point is the fact that Germans who immigrated after 1949, and their
descendants, are permanently classified by the government as having a “migration
background” (Migrationshintergrund).21 Both DIK and this exclusionary German national
identity reflect an overall approach which posits migration as something alien to Germany and
Muslim immigrants as meant for low wage work, if they should be allowed in to begin with.
While restrictive ideas on citizenship and the economic marginalization of Muslims dates
back into the mid 20th century, the political approach linking Islamic religion to security
concerns, gained footing in Germany after 9/11. This has caused relations between Muslim
immigrant populations and ‘ethnic Germans’ to shift from “peaceful mutual indifference” to a

19Federal

Office for Migration and Refugees, Muslim Life in Germany, Sonja Haug, Stephanie
Müssig & Anja Sichs. Federal Republic of Germany: German Conference on Islam, 2013.
20

Peter, Frank, “Welcoming Muslims into the Nation: Tolerance Politics and Integration in Germany” in Muslims in
the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics and Law, 123.
21

Federal Institute for Population Research, Population with a Migration Background, published in English, http://
www.bib-demografie.de/EN/Facts_Figures/Migration_Background/migration_background_node.html
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growing perception of Muslims as “not only different, but dangerous”.22 For example, the
German state refuses to grant official recognition to any Islamic group, even though it affords
such recognition to Christian and Jewish organizations.23 In certain German provinces, some
Islamic organizations are surveilled by the Verfassungsschutz, the security force tasked with
protecting constitutional values and democracy in Germany.24 Potential immigrants with ties to
organizations which the Verfassungsschutz has determined to be illiberal are often denied
citizenship altogether.25 Turkish Sunni group Milli Görüs, vigorously disputes its own
characterization as illiberal, claiming it has no intention of setting up a “parallel society” for
Muslims as the security services have charged.26 Nevertheless, the perspective of Mili Görüs is
unimportant for the Verfassungsschutz, who premise their judgement solely on their own
perceptions. This designation has proven extremely limiting for the thousands of German Turks
who are members of the group and can no longer apply for citizenship in some regions. In
positioning Islam as in conflict with democracy in its approach to the integration of Muslims, the
German state has forced potential Muslim immigrants and refugees to choose between their faith
and their society. Such an approach is aimed at the erasure of an Islamic identity as a
precondition for citizenship. It also operates under the unspoken premise that Islam is explicitly
at odds with democracy and not welcome in Germany or Europe.
22

Schiffauer, “Enemies within the Gate: The Debate about the Citizenship of Muslims in Germany” in
Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, 111.
23

Ibid., 99.

24

Ibid., 98.

25

Ibid., 111.

26

Ibid.
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Implications for the Perception and Treatment of Syrian Refugees
The internal-external dynamics of Germany’s humanitarian approach to refugees suggests
a number of troubling implications for the future of Syrians in Germany. Their integration into an
already stigmatized and impoverished minority aside, the cultural dynamics of refugee politics
suggests that Germany does not want Syrians to remain in Europe permanently. This can be seen
through the framework of securitization, as Muslims are increasingly perceived as a potential
“fifth column” in the global war between the West and Islamist terrorism. It can also be seen
through the complementary assertion, drawing from dominant European historiography, that
Islam is incompatible with the secular-liberal value systems of Europe.
Representations of Muslims already in Europe is reflective of these assumptions, and
invariably contributes to their socio-economic disenfranchisement. The failure of European
media and political discourse to abandon the automatic association of Syrian refugees with
cultural and security threats suggests that their integration into particular European societies will
occur along similar lines and result in similar disenfranchisement. A depoliticized Muslim
subject in the form of a Syrian refugee is thus integrated into a failing system. The
depoliticization of refugees allows them to be viewed, in the short term, as needy victims of a
violent culture, facilitating their entry into Europe. In the long term, they can be viewed with the
same suspicion as Muslims already within Germany, and be incorporated into the low economic
position as these same Muslims. Removing the Syrian refugee from their political context also
avoids problematizing the geopolitical status quo in the Middle East, which the European Union
obviously benefits from and plays an often hidden, material role in perpetuating.
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The foundations of such stigmatizing approaches to integration can be seen in the
concrete policies the German government has proposed. Social benefits for refugees are
dependent on German language and culture classes and participation in low wage work. Such
labor-dependent benefits are troubling, as the wages for refugees enrolled in such programs can
be as low as 80 cents per hour, an approach advocated by the International Monetary Fund.27
While German policy has also invested in education efforts for refugees, the existence of low
wage ‘workfare’ integration schemes and the inaccessibility of language classes suggests an
approach which places Syrians into the lower sectors of the economy and German society, just
like the Muslim populations already in Germany.
Relevant Theory: Knowledge, Discourse(s) and Global Power
Before determining the effects of German refugee discourse on Syrians, I must determine
what a“discourse” is and how it relates to the material exercise of power. As articulated by
social theorist Stuart Hall, there exists a hidden relationship between discourse and concrete
power relations. This relationship is difficult to imagine in the abstract, and is best viewed
through the lens of the “The West and the Rest”, a paradigm also coined by Hall. He defines
discourse as, “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about - i.e. a way of
representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic”28. This knowledge, produced here
through a lens which places the West in a position of innate superiority, has material
consequences for the “Rest” who are viewed as automatically inferior.29 Knowledge purporting
27

Barbière, Cécile, “IMF Recommends Paying Refugees Below the Minimum Wage” Euractiv News.

28

Hall, Stuart, “Chapter 6: The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power”, in The Formations of
Modernity: Understanding Modern Societies, ed. Bram Geiben and Stuart Hall.
29

Ibid., 203.
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to be objective is in reality, heavily agenda-ed. Hall sums this up when referencing preceding
arguments made by Michel Foucault:
Not only is discourse always implicated in power; discourse is one of the "systems"
through which power circulates. The knowledge which a discourse produces constitutes a
kind of power, exercised over those who are "known." When that knowledge is exercised
in practice, those who are "known" in a particular way will be subject (i.e. subjected) to
it. This is always a power-relation.30
This quote allows one to imagine the links between particular ways of representing or discussing
a social group and the exercise of power over said group by governments, for example. This
theory also shows how power is embedded in discourses which proport to be impartial. When a
subject is “known” through a means of representation which has little to do with the reality of
their being, they will be addressed by power via these unfair images.
To make this relation more concrete, I will point to a relevant example of discoursepower relations in French political scientist Jocelyn Cesari’s securitization thesis, which posits
that:
European states view Muslim groups as threats to their survival and take measures to
reassure citizens that they will not allow the incubation of terrorism. However, the
politicization of religion essentially impoverishes and threatens its survival, leading
devout Muslims to feel resentful of the interference of non-religious actors. Thus, the
measures intended to prevent radicalization actually engender feelings of discontent and

30

Ibid., 205.
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prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to fundamentalism. This is the process
of securitization.31
If particular governments, drawing from historical representations, imagine European Muslims
as dangerous religious fanatics, they will thus legislate Muslims based upon this perception. This
form of politics does not account for French foreign policy or imperial history as a relevant cause
of terrorism, blaming Islam alone for radicalization. Regardless of whether or not such an image
is based in the reality of Muslim minorities in France, policies must be crafted in relation to this
established “truth”, which addresses only part of the picture.
This “regime of truth” concerning Islam and the Middle East has been crafted over
millennia, as Europeans justified their own power interests with stereotypical and false
impressions of Arab culture. Edward Said’s landmark book Orientalism described this process in
more detail, writing,
...for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main
circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or an
American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a
situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however
dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more
important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of
involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.32

31

Cesari, Jocelyn “Securitization of Islam in Europe” in Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion Politics and Law,

1.
32

Said, Edward, Orientalism, 11, emphasis added.
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Following with Said’s analysis of 19th century Orientalism, contemporary discourse on refugees
and Syria is conducted without reference to the aforementioned material interests or the long
history of involvement in the Middle East, colonial or otherwise. Although the politics and rights
of Syrian refugees are heavily related to this history and current geopolitics, they are
disconnected and replaced with a decontextualized refugee subject onto which European
anxieties and prejudices can be projected onto.This Orientalist approach is clearly at work in
German media, though I will demonstrate that it extends beyond this to the material political
realm.
Syrian Refugees in the Mainstream German Media
Keeping in mind the importance of the media in shaping wider cultural and political
debate, it is necessary to specifically define just how Syrians are discussed and portrayed in the
German mainstream press. I will do this by examining initial responses to the presence of Syrian
refugees in German media, throughout 2015, the year of the “Syrian refugee crisis”. In doing so,
I will use a quantitative media analysis, published by the UNHCR, titled, Press Coverage of the
Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries. The
report analyzes press coverage of refugees in Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, Spain, and Italy.
In its analysis of German media, the report focuses on three German newspapers reflecting
mainstream German political positions, Bild (right-wing populist), Süddeutsche Zeitung (centerleft), and Die Welt (center-right).33 The report uses roughly 300 articles per country to assess
major themes and actors in national press coverage of “immigration and asylum policy” and

33

Berry, Mike et al. “Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five
European Countries” published by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, December 2015. 113.
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individual refugees from the Middle East or Africa who are moving to or are already in Europe.34
I find the report useful when thinking specifically about Syrian refugees, as roughly 70% of the
total German media coverage analyzed herein specifically focuses on refugees from Syria.35
The report highlights several encouraging components of German media coverage of
refugees, especially in relation to nations like the UK, whose coverage had been more generally
negative. Perhaps interestingly, these three German newspapers, regardless of their ideological
leaning, consistently used the terms “refugee” or “asylum seeker” , avoiding more negative terms
like “illegal”, “migrant” or “foreigner”.36 In turn, “there is almost no conflation [in the German
press]... between asylum and immigration”.37 Finally, a quarter of coverage specifically
referenced a humanitarian need for Germany to take in its fair share of Syrian refugees,
mirroring the centrist position on the crisis.38 Out of all the nations referenced in the report,
Germany was the most likely to appeal to the humanitarian dimension of the crisis.39
Hereafter, the limits of the report’s analysis become more apparent. Characterizing
German press coverage of refugees as positive ignores a plethora of evidence which could just as
easily prove the opposite point. Perhaps the characterization of German coverage as “positive” is
warranted in relation to more openly negative portrayals in the UK press, for example, but this

34

Ibid., 25.

35

Ibid., 113.

36

Ibid., 113.

37

Ibid., 114.

38

Ibid., 114.

39

Ibid., 113.
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comparative empathy should not lead us to believe that the German media is accurately or fairly
portraying refugees from Syria in their own right. The German press, during the time referenced
by this study, had consistently failed to frame the issue of refugees as anything but a European
problem located within Europe, ignoring the voices of refugees and refusing to explore the root
causes of or solutions to mass, conflict driven migration. In turn, German media coverage has
engaged in negative stereotyping of refugees, albeit in a more covert form. Due to the political
history of Germany, such overt political racism would be unthinkable in the public sphere.
However, the fact that racist opinions and unfair representation are cloaked in a veil of political
correctness and liberal rationality does not mean they do not exist. In the case of Germany,
appearances can be deceiving.
The large majority of testimonials used in the analyzed articles come from either
“domestic politicians” or German citizens.40 While roughly 8% of testimonials came from
refugees themselves, it often focused on either the tragedy of their journey to Europe, or their
successful economic or linguistic integration into German society.41 Though the former set of
coverage is limited mostly to the center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung, with the other two papers were
more willing to conversely frame integration as difficult or impossible and individual refugees as
an economic, cultural, or security threat to Germany.42 While the right wing press avoided
making the explicit connection between refugees and immigration, they do consistently utilize
immigration figures or levels in their coverage of the refugee crisis, negating the report’s prior

40

Ibid., 109.

41

Ibid., 108.

42

Ibid., 115.
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claim that the German press avoided the conflation of refugees and immigration. 58% of articles
in Bild and 82% of articles in Die Welt referenced immigration statistics in some form, implying
a hidden connection between refugees and immigration and leading readers to draw these
conclusions on their own, rather than stating them outright.43 These two papers were also more
likely to reference welfare benefits distribution, referencing the widespread belief within Europe
that refugees represent a drain on the welfare state.44
The framing of refugees as a cultural or security threat is significant in terms of
representation of Muslim refugees in particular, as these two elements remain consistent when
applied to Muslims within or outside of the West. In turn, the two are rarely applied on their own,
as discussions of cultural assimilation are usually tied to security anxieties. This is due to the
nature of the “terrorist threat” facing Europe, and the way this threat has been framed in media
and academic discourse. In the wake of 9/11, Western politicians and journalists consistently
framed such crimes as acts of hatred towards Western society and “Western values” of freedom
and democracy. These sort of explanations were rarely accompanied by an explicit condemnation
of Islam per se, but they certainly opened the space for such religious intolerance. This space has
been readily occupied by far-right groups, who can ignore the role of the West in Arab instability
and frame the issue of refugees as one of cultural deficiency and civilizational divergence. These
arguments reflect past historical discourses on so-called “Muslim barbarism”, which reach back
to Medieval Europe.

43

Ibid., 116.

44

Ibid., 116.
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In turn, such explanations rarely engage the issues of geopolitics or history, ignoring
more rational reasons why individual Muslims may feel compelled to commit such horrific
crimes. Even today, to suggest that “Islamic terror” is related to the massive historical violence
perpetrated by the West in Muslim countries is almost taboo; and opens one who makes these
arguments to accusations of terrorist sympathies or a kind of expansive, post-colonial white guilt.
These cultural arguments, raised in the German press, allow refugees very little agency in
terms of the way society views them. In turn, they imply a troubling approach to “assimilation”
which stresses the erasure of Islamic identity and more overt religious expression. While these
issues are vital to the discussion on media representation, I will return to them when discussing
German politics, an area where the language is much more overt, and the material effect of such
discourse on individual Muslim or Arab refugees is more clear.
In turn, the mainstream German press coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis focused on
the internal response within Germany rather than the causes of migration in the first place. “three
quarters of Bild articles and nearly two thirds of Süddeutsche Zeitung stories don’t provide any
explanations for refugee flows” compared with one third of the more analytical coverage in Die
Welt.45 However, the reasons given for the migration in Die Welt often remain in the realm of
surface level analysis: attributing migration to conflict and civil war yet failing to analyze the
dimensions and actors in particular conflicts and the degrees of their complicity in such violence.
Merely attributing the migration to “the Syrian Civil War” avoids the question of foreign actors
which have been pouring weapons, money, and soldiers into the conflict, actions which clearly
extend the war and drive displacement as a result. It also reflects a European tendency to avoid
45
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inward reflection on culpability in foreign conflicts, and a specific reluctance to critique the
European Union’s policy of regime change in Syria.
Reflective of this point, the solutions provided in the German media to the apparent crisis
of Syrian migration are Eurocentric in their focus; privileging internal solutions to limit or
increase the number of refugees coming to Germany rather than addressing the externalized
nature of the conflict in Syria. Conflict resolution is posited as a possible solution in only 0.7%
of total press coverage, while no solution is posed in 65% of the articles.46 The most popular
solution raised by the German press, aside from none at all, is to reduce levels of migration and
to reject or deport more refugees. This position is taken in 11% of the articles analyzed, while
9% of coverage takes the opposite and second most popular position, advocating more refugee
intake.47
Dissecting Internal/External Rhetorical Humanitarianism in Media Coverage
German press coverage is similarly unwilling to engage the foreign policy of Western
governments or any other outside actor as a cause of Syrian migration. The report notes that the
closest thing to such an engagement is a statement from a Green Party politician in Süddeutsche
Zeitung who asks if groups fighting the Islamic State should receive weapons from Western
governments.48 This decontextualization and refusal to critically assess the roles of outside
governments in the escalation and prolongment of this war reflects the EU policy on Syria, as
articulated in their official position, adopted by the European Council on April 3, 2017. The
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document continuously calls for a diplomatic solution to the war in Syria, and does reference
outside intervention in the conflict.49 However, this attention to outside actors is specifically
limited to Turkey, Russia and Iran, focusing more on the latter two allies of the Assad regime
which it condemns as primarily responsible for the displacement of the Syrian people.50 Notably
absent from this condemnation are any members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United
States, and any EU countries involved in some form in the crisis. This omission is deliberate, and
signifies the ultimate positioning of the European Union on Syria. The document states that the
European Union stands firmly on the side of the Syrian opposition and will support ongoing
attempts by the fractured groups to solidify their messaging and opposition to Assad.51 No
reference is made to particular groups on the ground, aside from negative critiques of the Assad
regime and, to a lesser degree, ISIS.
Why, in this document, is the EU attempting to position itself as an arbitrator when it
simultaneously condemns the Assad regime and supports ongoing opposition efforts? In reality,
the European Union and its Western ally the United States, are highly involved in the conflict,
albeit in more covert means. The United States has specifically bombed both Syrian military and
ISIS targets, while providing weapons aid and financial support to opposition groups even before
the 2011 protests erupted into civil war. Painting the EU position as humanitarian in nature is
perhaps partially true (the EU is the single largest provider of humanitarian aid in Syria), yet it
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obscures their very real interest in toppling Assad or at least creating a new political system in
Syria with or without his collaboration.52
This neutral rhetorical positioning also serves a number of alternate social functions with
regards to both refugees and the internal political dynamics of Syria. Firstly, it avoids the
problematic line of thought which casts Western actions in Syria as extending the suffering of the
Syrian people. In turn, it avoids a critical assessment of the groups which the West supports in
Syria, aka the “Good Muslims”, in the words of Mahmood Mamdani, whose ideas I will engage
later on.53 Secondly, and more pertinent to the topic at hand, it allows domestic European
politicians to position EU member states accepting refugees as a purely humanitarian exercise,
rather than taking responsibility for a war which they and their allies in the region have clearly
helped to extend. Calling for an end to violence, while not admitting their role in it and refusing
to attribute it to anyone but their geopolitical enemies allows the EU to claim a position of moral
superiority over other foreign actors more overtly involved in Syria. This agenda-ed positioning
recalls more general theories of Eurocentrism and the way it functions in media and political
discourse.
Eurocentrism and EU Humanitarian Rhetoric
In the introduction to their book Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the
Media, film scholars Robert Stam and Ella Shohat detail the various ways in which Eurocentrism
functions in cultural discourse, though the points can generally be extrapolated to apply to
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political discourse as well. Two of the points are directly applicable to the German media
coverage of Syrian refugees and the EU position on the civil war:
1.Eurocentric discourse projects a linear historical trajectory leading from Classical
Greece to Imperial Rome and then to the metropolitan capitals of Europe and the US...In
all cases, Europe, alone and unaided, is seen as the “motor” for progressive historical
change; it invents democracy, class society, feudalism, capitalism, the industrial
revolution….4. Eurocentrism minimizes the West’s oppressive practices by regarding
them as contingent, accidental, exceptional. Colonialism, slave-trading, and imperialism
are not seen as fundamental catalysts of the West’s disproportionate power. 54
The first point is useful when viewed in relation to the European Union’s projected image as a
neutral humanitarian actor seeking the most humane solution to the plight facing the Syrian
people. The assumption of Europe’s exceptional moral standing sets a large rhetorical barrier in
the way of meaningful engagement with the historical and political role Europe has played in the
continued destabilization of the Middle East. Superficial engagement is perhaps possible, yet
even the actions which by some standards can be seen as immoral can be justified through the
fourth point, which explains away Western oppression as benevolent or necessary. This second
function is directly applicable to Syrian refugees within Europe, as it covertly justifies prejudice
against them. If the West is benevolent in its aims and always justified in its means, why should
the position of the European Union be viewed as anything but benevolent? In turn, through the
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lens of Eurocentrism, such claims of Western, disinterested benevolence cast a shadow of
suspicion onto individual Arab refugees.
As the European Union and other Western governments have identified two main drivers
of the migration to Europe, it is important to assess the implications of this specificity on Syrian
refugees in the West. The two main actors at fault, according to the EU, are 1. Bashar al-Assad
and his allies (Russia, Iran, Hezbollah), and 2. ISIS and (some) comparable Sunni terrorist
organizations. Yet the characterization of such groups as a primary driver of migration along with
the Syrian government is problematic as they fight on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict.
Where do ordinary Syrian citizens fit into this picture? If the EU is positioning ISIS as bad and
the Syrian government as also and perhaps more bad, this simultaneously problematizes the
Syrian opposition and government, while apparently advocating for a vague conglomerate of
supposedly moderate rebels with whom the average European is not at all familiar. Syrians on all
sides of the conflict can be problematized within such a discourse. Refugees fleeing the conflict
can never be viewed as trustworthy, because of their relation to these problematic modes of
violence.
In this vein, the issue of representation cannot be reduced to images of refugees already
in Europe, as the European media has repeatedly attempted to frame the issue. Discussing Syrian
refugees as an internal, European problem says more about the foreign policy of the European
Union than it does about their approach to migration. The internal focus of German media
discourse fits into a wider European projection of their own policy as purely humanitarian thus
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making the EU a credible partner in crafting, in the words of the European Council, a “genuine,
inclusive political transition”.55
Can such claims to neutrality be taken at face value from a power which has taken a clear
side? Moreover, how does the policy of the European Union on Syria affect the way member
states treat individual Syrian refugees in their territory? Do these images of humanitarianism
have any precedent in recent history?
Keeping these questions in mind, this humanitarian language must be critically assessed
in relation to internal treatment of refugees, and to external foreign policy. In studying both of
these relationships, it is quite clear that the European Union’s self-image of a humanitarian
power is problematic and not completely accurate. When reading between the lines of such
language, it becomes clear that internal charity comes with strings attached and is, contrary to the
caring language of German Willkommenspolitik56 not guaranteed on the basis of common
humanity or experiences of extreme violence or political repression.
Culture and Security in the Political Right Wing
The mainstream centrist political approach within Germany carries with it many cultural
assumptions about Syrian refugees and the violence they have experienced. Assimilatory politics
concerning Muslim immigrants or refugees throughout Europe are similarly premised on these
assumptions, frequently implying the erasure of Islamic culture as the prerequisite for proper
integration into European society. Mandatory language courses, classes on European “cultural
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values”, and state restrictions on the practice of Islam prove this point more clearly. This
approach, however culturally based, never veers into the realm of overt racist language.
Politicians like Angela Merkel are often careful to avoid such language and let the policies speak
for themselves. However, this politically correct language does not negate the underlying
premise of such politics which posits that cultural erasure, be it linguistic or religious, is the only
way for Muslims to live peacefully in Europe. In turn, it leaves space open for a misguided
critique from the right, which mirrors these assumptions, amplifies the intensity of
discriminatory politics, and utilizes overtly racialized language to reinforce feelings of mistrust
which some white Europeans feel towards their brown neighbors. Such politics also embrace a
revisionist historical narrative affirming the presence of a pure, dynamic, “Judeo-Christian”
European identity in relation to a static, deficient, Muslim identity.
This form of political discourse is being utilized by many parties within Europe’s
resurgent far-right. Replacing past overt Anti-Semitism from the far right is a relatively new,
racialized Islamophobia. I have identified several key features of far-right populist parties like
the AfD in Germany, with regards to refugee policy and Islam, including:
i.

Fears that Europe is being culturally “Islamized” by large scale acceptance of mostly
Muslim refugees, destroying its “Christian” identity and cultural values.

ii. Fears that influxes of refugees will bring with them increases in terror: that such violence
is endemic to the Muslim faith and culture and thus unavoidable when welcoming
refugees from Muslim countries.
iii. Fears that refugees will use more than their fair share of government benefits, or a belief
that refugees are undeserving of any government assistance.
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iv. A linguistic insistence that their intolerance is culturally, economically or historicallybased, ergo, not racist.
Social Intolerance: The AfD Approach to Refugees
The Alternative for Germany Party (AfD) provides a perfect demonstration of the
preceding points, which can be applied to most far-right parties within Europe more generally.
However, the mere existence of such a party within Germany makes it a special case. Far-right
parties, while newly resurgent, have been consistently present within mainstream political
discourse in most of Western Europe. However, no party to the right of the centrist CDU has ever
breached the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation in Germany’s Federal Bundestag.
This is due to the unique historical memory of German politics, and the events of the Nazi era.
Germans have always been uniquely aware of the dangers of overt political racism, and past right
wing parties that seemed to flirt with racist or neo-nazi language, like the National Democratic
Party, remained marginalized by most Germans. However, the evolving and flexible political
message of the AfD, combined with perceptions of an out of control refugee “crisis” has allowed
them to gain a significant foothold in German politics, and mainstream legitimization of their
intolerant message.
The Alternative for Germany party was founded in April 2013 as an economically liberal,
Eurosceptic conservative party. The main impetus for the founding of the AfD was the 2011
Eurozone crisis and the bailout measures for Southern European nations advocated by Germany,
the wealthiest nation in the European Union. Many Germans were resentful of the perceived
financial burden such bailouts entailed, and thought it unfair that Germans would have to bail out
the Southern Europeans. This crisis provided what German political scientist Frank Decker
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described as the AfD’s “populist moment”.57 Decker then elaborates, claiming that the Euro
crisis:
...opened the window of opportunity for a new eurosceptic party whose primary policy
demands—a controlled dissolution of the monetary union and the rejection of a further
deepening of the European integration process—lent themselves to the attachment of a
broader right-wing populist platform to it.58
In other terms, the economic nationalism implied by an exit from the Euro opened the door for
less mainstream right wing discourse to enter the political scene on the back of a seemingly
mainstream political movement. Even the name of the party implies a respect for democratic
norms of debate unparalleled in comparable European right wing parties. They are presented as a
simple “alternative”; one opinion among many- equal in value by virtue of their wide support.
If the Eurozone Crisis provided the impetus for the AfD’s creation, the so-called “refugee
crisis” of 2015 provided it with the opportunity for significant legitimization and growth. Before
Syrian refugees began migrating to Europe in large numbers, “AfD members had to contend with
was the simple fact that its primary mobilization tool….had disappeared from the headlines”59.
Simply put, the lessening intensity of the currency crisis had brought about a decline in public
interest in the AfD. The arrival of Syrian refugees on Europe’s shores provided the party with its
second “populist moment”, in addition to a means for the party to shift further to the right.
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During the refugee crisis, the AfD effectively expanded its membership by adopting
cultural and historical arguments which would have been untenable for a movement seeking
electoral success at any other point in post-war German history. A reading of their current
manifesto, the platform which enabled their movement into the federal Bundestag as the third
largest party, combined with a look at more grassroots Islamophobic and racist movements
shows the degree to which their simultaneous legitimization and electoral success was aided by
German discomfort with Muslim refugees.
Under a section titled “Culture, Language and Identity” the AfD advocates for the
promotion and preservation of a German “predominant culture instead of multiculturalism”,
using the German term leitkultur (guiding culture), echoing past arguments against immigration
made by less mainstream right wing groups.60 The term is controversial within Germany, as it
brings up unpleasant parallels to Nazi arguments concerning the superiority of German culture
within Europe. However, the AfD demonstrates that it is not uncomfortable with this parallel,
claiming later in the “Culture” section that, “The current narrowing of the German culture of
remembrance to the time of National Socialism should be opened in favour of a broader
understanding of history, which also encompasses the positive, identity-establishing aspects of
German history”.61 Cloaked in benign language, this historical revisionism targets feelings of
national pride and implies that a culture which looks upon racist genocide with shame is denying
its people patriotism which other peoples enjoy without guilt. More subtly, it opens up the space
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for a reassertion of German nationalism based upon a homogenous, Christian identity. Echoing
Shoat’s definition of Eurocentrism, this is made clear in their assertion that German culture is
comprised of, “firstly, the religious traditions of Christianity; secondly, the scientific and
humanistic heritage, whose ancient roots were renewed during the period of Renaissance and the
Age of Enlightenment; and thirdly, Roman law, upon which our state is founded”.62
Partially reflecting the first characteristic of European far-right politics, a construction of
unified “Christian Europe”, the manifesto then shifts its focus to Muslims to reflect the point in
its whole. The document flatly states that “Islam does not belong to Germany” and claims to
oppose “Islamic practice which is directed against our liberal-democratic constitutional order,
our laws, and the Judeo-Christian and humanist foundations of our culture”.63 It goes on to
advocate for the denial of official recognition of Islamic groups, banning mosques with minarets,
which it sees as a “symbol of Islamic supremacy”, and a ban on headscarves for public servants
and students in line with French secularism (laïcite).64
These Islamophobic cultural arguments are further reflected in the section on
“Immigration Integration and Asylum”. The section begins with the assertion that the debate on
asylum in Germany is “characterized by an ideologically-biased climate of political correctness,
accompanied by banned terms and newspeak”65. This claim is reflective of my own, namely that
centrist discourse on refugees which feeds into cultural stereotypes, cloaked in political
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correctness, opens up space for a superficial critique of asylum on this basis. The section
advocates for a “case by case” method for assessing asylum applications, limiting the number of
refugees simply by way of logistics.66 It then goes on to decry what it sees as an insufficient
process of integration on the part of recent refugees, claiming that “the continuing influx of
people with extremely poor integration prospects exacerbates existing problems, and is therefore
irresponsible”.67 It is not difficult to determine who they are referring to, even though the words
“Muslim” or “Syrian” do not appear in this section.
Reflective of the fourth point of convergence for far-right European parties, the AfD then
denounces low skilled migrants, who it claims are “abusively applying for asylum, and then have
to rely on tax-funded social aid”.68 Unsurprisingly, the AfD advocates that such social benefits
should only be extended to those it believes have made an effort to fully integrate into German
society and embrace German values. Wrapped in calls for “transparency”, the party also calls for
the publication of the nationality of welfare recipients.69 Hidden in these seemingly rational
proposals are implications that refugees are incompatible with life in Germany, and that social
spending should focus on “Germans”, but only the right ones, and definitely not refugees.
Mirroring my second common feature of the far-right, the AfD’s manifesto calls for
transparency in the reporting of “immigrant crime”. It goes on to state that, “Immigration-related
crime is extremely difficult to combat – embedded, as it is, in family, clan and cultural structures,
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and aided by language barriers”, explicitly tying violence to local cultures.70 Finally, the
protection of borders is raised in the document, as it calls for the creation of a German border
police force, even though Germany is in the Schengen Zone and is surrounded by nations which
are also entitled to border-free travel.71 This is an obvious allusion to the issue of immigration
and is tied to the party’s call for a severe decrease in asylum cases and their desire for Germany
to leave the European Union.
While all of these policies do mirror the centrist approach, they move significantly
beyond it and abandon the language of humanitarianism. In turn, the platform, while advocating
for the rights of German victims of “immigrant crime” makes no reference to crimes committed
by Germans against immigrants and refugees. This is a vital omission, as attacks against asylum
seekers have increased with the large number of refugees arriving in Germany after 2014.
Material Intolerance: Grassroots Movements and Reactionary Violence
Attacks against refugees have been a recurring tactic of East and West German right wing
groups since before the fall of the Berlin Wall. More recently, the numbers have increased
significantly. In 2016, there were 10 attacks on asylum seekers per day, with 3,533 total attacks
on refugees and asylum centers.72 This number represents an increase from the roughly 1000
attacks against refugees in 2015, although the number of refugees entering Germany dropped
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from 500,000 to 280,000 over that same time.73 This period of time also correlates closely with
the rise of the AfD, and the fall of a more grassroots, more overtly racist right wing movement.
PEGIDA, a German acronym for “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the
West” (Patriotische Europäer Gegen Die Islamisierung Des Abendlandes) was founded in the
East German city of Dresden in 2014. The group was specifically founded to intimidate Kurdish
activists within Dresden, holding weekly marches through the streets every Monday; a tradition
which continues to this day.74 The groups seeks to defend what it calls the “Christian-Jewish
culture of the Occident” against Islamization and the establishment of Muslim “parallel
societies” in Germany.75 This discourse closely mirrors the language of the AfD in its historical
image of a Europe united by Christianity, and forms the bulk of Pegida's ideological platform. In
turn, both Pegida and the AfD have not been afraid to flirt with the images and languages of
fascism, with both groups using the nazi-era term lügenpresse or ‘lying press’ to refer to liberal
publications who accuse the group of racism. Like the AfD, Pegida’s arguments against refugees
is cloaked in language of history and culture. Such groups can fall back on the platitude “Islam is
not a race” while presenting Orientalist images of refugees which are clearly aimed at Arab
people. These arguments fall into a pattern of discourse labeled as “anti-Muslim racism” which
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uses extremely racialized language targeted mostly at Arabs but utilizing the more general term
“Islam”.76
While many would assume the anti-Muslim racism of Pegida would propel the movement
into the mainstream during the Syrian refugee crisis, the exact opposite occurred. Starting in late
2015, the height of the refugee crisis, “the tide started to turn against Pegida”.77 Pegida-backed
candidates in local elections in Hamburg and Dresden failed to gain a significant number of votes
in 2016, and the group’s influence only expanded beyond Dresden during specific incidents of
terror, such as the 2016 New Years Eve attacks in Cologne committed by a group of North
African asylum seekers.78 This decline does not represent the marginalization of anti-Muslim
racist views however, as the period of decline for Pegida coincided with the meteoric rise of the
AfD and their eventual ascension into both the European Parliament and the Bundestag. If
anything, the anti-establishment tone and tactics of Pegida were made useless by the
mainstreaming of their overall messaging. The decline of such local far-right groups
paradoxically represents the normalization and widespread acceptance of their political racism.
Supporting this connection between the fall of Pegida and the rise of the AfD is the
geographic distribution of those who supported the AfD in the 2017 elections. The party’s gains
were strongest in former East Germany, the stronghold of the Pegida movement.79 The eastern
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city of Dresden supported the AfD in significant numbers.80 More tellingly, the majority of new
AfD voters were not previously registered with any mainstream political parties, mirroring the
anti-establishment mood of the Pegida movement and other far-right groups which had been
marginalized by German political culture in the past.81
Linking the Center to the Right Wing: Obfuscation of Geopolitical Interests
How then, does the rise of the right wing in German political culture relate to more
general discourse on the presence of Syrian refugees? This question is innately tied with the way
that centrist media and politicians have been framing the issue. As I have previously shown,
media coverage of the refugee crisis has consistently remained within the German and
humanitarian contexts. Namely, this discourse posits that Germans must help refugees for
humanitarian purposes and that the political dimensions behind the displacement of individual
refugees is not a part of the discussion. Thus the actors remain firmly situated within Europe,
focusing attention away from the actions of political actors in the Middle East. The question
which is consistently asked is “how will these refugees affect Westerners?” not “how have the
actions and interests of European governments created refugees in the first place?” When media
discourse focuses exclusively on the effects of migration on Germans, Germans can be more
easily framed as victims when more negative effects of migration arise. The inability for the
German center to entertain the idea of a political solution to this crisis opens the space for such
German victimization and demonization of refugees.
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Moreover, what is clearly evident in both the centrist and right wing approaches to Islam
and refugees is that their policies have little to do with Islam and migration and everything to do
with concrete European interests in the Middle East and historically constructed ideals of a
unified, Christian Europe. Reflective of this point is the fact that the provinces with the highest
rates of AfD support were “parts of Eastern Germany where immigration has been lowest”.82
These provinces, which have also provided the popular base for Pegida, also have the lowest
measures of religious diversity, with more diverse provinces supporting more pro-refugee parties
and policies.83
This right wing approach is a distinct reaction to mainstream liberal discourse on
refugees and the policies of the Merkel government with regards to the 2015 influx of Syrians.
Understanding the degree to which these two are linked can be seen with regards to the ways in
which both the right and the center refuse to identify Western foreign policy and those of its
regional allies as drivers of migration from Syria. Like the mainstream German media, these two
approaches frame the issue of migration as a wholly European problem, locating the actors and
policies solely within the framework of Europe, mirroring Shoat’s arguments on Eurocentrism.
In turn, both extend such depoliticization to the refugees themselves, addressing them, through
rhetoric or policy, in mostly cultural or economic terms. However, this depoliticization occurs
within slightly differing frameworks. While the right wing approach stigmatizes all of Islam and
Muslims, the liberal approach uses this stigmatization selectively, problematizing specific
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practices and aspects of Islam or Muslims while acknowledging the existence of ‘good Muslims’
and a humanitarian need to help refugees despite their cultural differences.
Culture Talk
German political and cultural rhetoric surrounding refugees and integration reflect past
discourses on Muslim immigrants more generally, and have implications reaching far beyond the
treatment of these populations within Europe. They are more reflective of a larger picture; the
strategy and aims of the West in the Middle East. This can be demonstrated in the way that
foreign policy discourse and internal assimilatory arguments both take the form of what political
scientist Mahmood Mamdani calls “Culture Talk”. He summarizes this discourse as such:
According to some [Muslim] culture seems to have no history, no politics, and no
debates, so that all Muslims are just plain bad. According to others, there is a history, a
politics, even debates, and there are good Muslims and bad Muslims. In both versions,
history seems to be petrified into a lifeless custom of an antique people who inhabit
antique lands...One thinks of pre modern people as those who are not yet modern...the
other depicts the premodern as the anti modern.84
These competing modes of representation seem to be the hegemonic means of discourse in the
West in reference to the Middle East. Both paradigms can be easily reflected in European
approaches to Muslim migration and the specific issue of Syrian refugees. With regards to the
political discourse of the German center on the subject of Syrians, the means of representation is
almost certainly that of “good Muslims vs. bad Muslims”, while the right wing discourse does
not recognize the existence of “good muslims” at all. In turn, the “petrified history” which
84
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Mamadi references perfectly reflects Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism which represents
Arabs as “static, almost ideal types, and neither as creatures with a potential in the process of
being realized nor as history being made”.85 Thus, within such cultural discourse, Syrians cannot
represent themselves, and are not active participants in history but passive actors defined solely
in relation to their static culture and history, which are in turn intrinsically tied to violence and
anti-modernism.
All of these complex theoretical implications are hidden within the German centrist
approach to refugees, and migration from the Islamic world more generally, behind a veil of
political correctness and perceived cultural relativism. In other words, non specific deferences to
“good Muslims” while stigmatizing the “bad ones”. As I have shown in my examination of the
far-right approach to refugees and Islam, this simple discursive acknowledgment of the existence
of “good Muslims” opens up space for a reactionary embrace of Mamdani's first iteration of
culture talk- the insistence that all Muslims are “bad Muslims” and thus cannot be integrated into
Europe.86 In order to understand the ways these two modes of representation work together
however, the shifting policies of the German center with regards to both Islam and refugees must
be critically examined, paying particular attention to the ways in which such an approach reflects
Mamdani's theory of culture talk. From such an investigation, the ways in which both approaches
stigmatize refugees and Muslims will be made more clear.
Merkel’s Humanitarian Approach (2015)
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To critically examine the approach of Angela Merkel and her Christian Democratic Union
Party (CDU) is not to diminish the comparative compassion shown by her embrace of a
Willkommenspolitik with regards to refugees. As in our examination of media discourse, the
German approach seems to more thoroughly humanize refugees than the politics of, for example,
Britain and France, whose governments use more racialized language and embrace harsher
denunciations of Islam and Muslims in crafting national policy. In the minds of many Syrian
refugees, Merkel’s political approach represents an unprecedented recognition of their humanity
and the worth of their lives. This does not, however, erase the cultural stereotypes and hidden
interests present in Merkel’s political discourse and policies. Willkommenspolitik may represent
the most humanistic recognition of refugees in Europe, but it is still a European approach, rife
with historical constructions of the Muslim “other”. The limits of such “welcoming” were shown
in 2016, with the German-led EU deal with Turkey in which thousands of refugees in Europe
were deported to Turkey in exchange for 3 billion Euros and visa-free travel for Turkish citizens.
Moreover, the German approach to “Muslim integration”, which refugee policies have reflected
to a degree, engage even more obviously in the problematization and stigmatization of culture
inherent in “culture talk”.
Merkel’s assertion that “we can do it” triggered an immense migration of Syrian refugees
into a supposedly accepting society. As of today, 800,000 refugees have been resettled in
Germany since 2015, the largest percentage of which are Syrian.87 The number was initially
much higher, though many have left for Scandinavia or have been deported to their countries of
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origin.88 The initial reactions within the German political scene were sympathetic to the policies
of Merkel, and stressed a liberal responsibility to protect those fleeing tyranny. However,
refugees arriving in Germany faced a more complex society than these statements would suggest.
Many within Germany were openly hostile to the idea of large scale acceptance of Muslim
refugees, and new arrivals faced a complicated nexus of integration policies closely reflective of
the situation facing Muslims already in Germany. In this vein, German society more generally
was less welcoming than Merkel’s rhetoric would suggest, and the German approach to
integration more reflective of past discourses on Islam.
The official German state response to the refugee crisis has shifted throughout the crisis
and has been dependent on the prevailing domestic political situation. Before asylum claims are
processed, prospective refugees live in large scale camps run by private organizations, not
separated by language, culture, geography, religion, or any other social classification.89 When
their claims are processed and asylum is granted, refugees are placed geographically by the
government to ensure their even distribution throughout Germany. If refugees move from their
original location, this will negatively affect access to government benefits.90
In addition to depending on geography, access to benefits is crucially dependent on
cultural and economic assimilation. While language and job training courses are not necessarily
mandatory for refugees, refusing to take such courses or failing them does result in a reduction of
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benefits.91 For many, these language courses are inaccessible, as the demand is high and waiting
periods for admission into a free class can be long.92 Private classes are, by contrast, much more
expensive. These issues of accessibility have a material impact on the wellbeing of refugees. For
example, American public health professionals in Berlin have reported that some refugees fear
making appointments at clinics due to the language barrier, and thus cannot access preventative
health care.93 However, while language skills have been officially positioned as essential for
German society’s acceptance of refugees, a study by the German Institute for Economic
Research found that refugees with stronger German language skills perceived more
discrimination from ‘ethnic Germans’ than those who cannot speak German.94
The aim of the relative importance of language acquisition in the liberal approach reflects
a paradigm of integration premised on assimilation, “a process in which individuals give up their
old culture, exchanging it for the culture of their new society”.95 The ultimate goal of the German
approach, in conjunction with a cultural erasure, is labor force participation. In exchange for
participation in language and ‘German values’ courses, refugees are eligible for subsidized living
expenses like food and rent, along with the opportunity to qualify for low skill ‘workfare’ jobs
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paying 80 cents an hour.96 In turn, the government has encouraged private employers to hire
refugees, scrapping an old law which forced them to prove no German was qualified for the
work before hiring foreigners.97 However, this pressure is not legally binding, and is similarly
impeded by a reluctance to hire refugees on the part of employers, and, on the part of the
refugees, a lack of access to language courses and educational opportunities.
The particular integration method taking place in Germany challenges the humanitarian
rhetoric of the German state with regards to refugees. While the actual policies governing the
treatment of refugees are generous by some measure, they take place amidst a cultural-political
context which greatly stigmatizes Muslims generally and refugees specifically. In turn, the
policies on economic integration privilege low-wage labor and do little to promote upward
mobility of refugees in Germany. This dynamic is increasingly relevant today, as the far-right
advances into parliament, driving the governing CDU closer to the political right. Reflective of
this political shift are Angela Merkel’s promotion of a ban on burqas “wherever legally
possible”, saying such practices run counter to integration and hold “no place in Germany”.98 In
2016, the German government had also taken steps to limit and decrease the number of refugees
in Germany, forcibly deporting 25,375 refugees and non forcibly expelling an additional
50,000.99 Most of those who were deported came to Germany from Afghanistan or the Balkans
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but the state also deported refugees from Syria and Iraq.100 In 2016, the state also granted full
asylum status to significantly less Syrians then they did in 2015.101
Cultural Politics and a Rhetorical-Political Shift (2016-17)
The increase in deportations of refugees in 2016 was reflective of an overall shift in
Germany’s refugee policy and policies on Islam in general.While Germany still hosts a large
number of refugees, the days of open borders and social acceptance have become a thing of the
recent past. With the ascendance of the political right, mainstream centrists in Berlin have shifted
their rhetoric to appeal to the rising xenophobic sentiments in the country. This political and
linguistic shift can be further demonstrated by two policies: the 2016 EU-Turkey deal, a recently
announced maximum cap on asylum claims, in addition to the proposed burqa ban and increases
in deportations to war torn nations.
This shift, along with the concurrent rise of the political right wing, can be traced to the
2016 New Year’s Eve attacks in Cologne, in which 650 women were assaulted or robbed during
a celebration in front of Cologne’s iconic cathedral.102 Many of the victims reported sexual
assaults, and the incident was blamed on North African immigrants and refugees.103 Although the
perpetrators of these crimes did not arrive with the 2015 wave of Syrian refugees, possible links

100

Frank, “A spectre in Germany”.

101

Ibid.

102

Shuster, Simon. "Fear and Loathing: A Scandal over Sexual Assaults by Migrants Exposes
the Challenge of Integrating Refugees in Europe." in Time Magazine.
103

Ibid.

Zarif !44

between migration and crime were vigorously debated throughout German society, and Merkel’s
approval ratings fell well below 50% for the first time since the crisis began in 2015.104
Three months after the attacks in Cologne, on March 18 2016, the EU announced a deal
with Turkey in which thousands of refugees in Greece, whose asylum claims have not been
processed, would be deported to Turkey, in exchange for 3 billion Euros in aid and visa
liberalisation for Turkish nationals traveling to the EU.105 It also includes a vague provision
stating that for each Syrian resettled in Turkey, one will be resettled from Turkey to the EU,
though this number is capped at 72,000.106 The deal was advantageous for Turkey, whose
integration into the EU has been stalled over European concerns about the Erdogan government’s
political authoritarianism and growing theocratic tendencies. The deal called for new rounds of
talks concerning Turkey’s aspirations towards EU membership without posing preconditions as
per the EU’s previous stance on Turkish membership.107 For the EU, it allowed them to sidestep
international legal requirements for processing asylum claims. Culturally speaking, the deal
reinforces the idea that such refugees are better off in the Muslim world and cannot be integrated
in such large numbers into Europe. For their part, the refugees were punished for illegally
crossing into the EU and sent back to a nation which already hosts the majority of refugees from
Syria, and in which their socioeconomic status and access to public benefits remains precarious.
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Amidst larger and larger numbers of rejected asylum applications and deportations of
refugees to war zones, Angela Merkel shifted even further away from her initial embrace of
refugees in 2017. On October 9 2017, Merkel’s CDU party announced a 200,000 person limit on
asylum claims, saying in a joint statement with the Christian Social Union Party that the events
of 2015 “cannot be repeated”.108 This statement represents an unprecedented reversal of her
position. From 2015 until now, Merkel had rejected any limits on refugee intake as a violation of
human rights.109 The reversal of the CDU’s humanitarian position on refugees and the
legitimization of the far-right represents the influence of a widespread cultural anxiety over
Islam’s place in German society which was present before the influx of Syrian refugees. A 2014
study done by the University of Leipzig found that 57% percent of German respondents agreed
with the statements, “Muslims and their religion are so different to us that it would be illusory to
claim equal access to all positions in society” and “The Islamic world is lagging behind and
refuses new realities.”.110 However, these opinions mostly laid beneath the surface within
German political discourse before 2015. Increasingly, these underlying fears have been projected
onto Syrian refugees, though they have little to do with their presence in Germany. Their
appearance in centrist German rhetoric in turn reflects Merkel’s attempts to court far-right voters
in the wake of her loss of a parliamentary majority in the September 2017 election.
Conclusion(s)
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When examined within a wider political context, the German approach to Syrian refugees
fits into a wider pattern of interactions between the West and the Middle East, complete with
images verging on the classical Orientalism of the era of high imperialism. Humanitarian
rhetoric, coupled with the existence of hidden material interests, is a characteristic of countless
European imperial encounters using the ‘white man’s burden’ argument. With reference to the
photo series I mentioned in my introduction, the role of this representation within such
encounters is clear. The refugees photographed in Koelbl’s project are presented solely through
her lens. The message of their suffering, is depicted and interpreted, by the artist, as a call for
humanitarian aid by the West.111 However, can we imagine how the project may have been
different if the refugees were allowed to represent themselves? Would the message have been the
same? Would the Foreign Office still permit the exhibition of the images in their lobby? Would
the project lend itself so perfectly to the political messaging of the German government?
The external representation shown in this photo series is characteristic of all the forms of
representation I have detailed in this paper. The German press mostly ignored the perspectives of
refugees from their coverage. The AfD and Pegida find the most support for their anti-Muslim
racist politics in areas of low religious diversity and immigration. The German political approach
more generally cannot be challenged by Syrians, as they cannot vote and have very limited
access to any form of political representation aside from Western humanitarian NGOs. Like the
colonized of the past, Syrians in contemporary Germany are almost totally unable to represent
themselves. Their experience in Germany is dependent on modes of representation which have
very little relation to their lives and beliefs. They arrive in a society with preconceived notions
111
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about who they are and why they have migrated, and which judges them on these false grounds.
They are placed in the care of a government which refuses to acknowledge the degree to which it
benefits from their displacement and the destruction of their homes. They are positioned as
victims of their own culture, which they must erase to be recognized as fully human. Their
victimhood is depicted without reference to the multitude of actors driving their displacement,
framing it as existing in a geopolitical vacuum and erasing any responsibility on the part of their
host nations. They are thoroughly problematized in every step of their journey, facing social
exclusion and racist violence. This socially and historically constructed “regime of truth”
guiding the present and future of Syrians in Germany will not allow them to be integrated into
German society. As long as they are represented by powers which do not recognize their full
humanity, they will be disenfranchised and mistreated. As long as others are allowed to tell and
exploit the stories of their suffering while claiming to have their best interest, they will not
achieve justice or equality, as such a discourse does not owe them anything of the sort.
It is even more difficult to imagine a just future for Syrians when considering the trends
of contemporary German and European politics. In the wake of the AfD’s ascendancy to the
German Bundestag as the third largest party, Merkel’s CDU has backtracked from its initial
humanistic refugee rhetoric, and has begun to shed pretensions of cultural relativism with regards
to Islam in general. This scramble to please the far right is further compounded by the desire of
Merkel’s to form a majority government with the aid of the conservative Free Democratic Party,
who opposed the refugee policies of 2015. As German politics swing further to the right, towards
a rejection of Merkel’s Willkommenspolitik, the politically disenfranchised Syrians in Germany
will remain at the whim of policy crafted through an increasingly limited regime of truth. Being
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seen and legislated through such a discriminatory means of representation will only amplify the
concerns I have expressed in this paper. Such a German shift will allow for a further penetration
of right wing cultural politics into Europe more generally, mainstreaming anti-Muslim racism
which had been previously marginalized in European political discourse. In turn, the border
policy of the European Union, and its very limited acceptance of refugees, will most likely suffer
attacks from the political right wing, endangering the lives of the few refugees who have been
resettled in the EU. Syrians have no just future in such a Europe, and no safe place to return
home to any time soon.
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